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In recent years, advocates for children have often asserted that paren-
tal rights conflict with children's interests. Deference to parental rights,
some have claimed, ensures that children are treated more like property
than people.'
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
1. See, e.g., George H. Russ, Through the Eyes of a Child, "Gregory K." A Child's
Right to Be Heard, 27 FAM. L.Q. 365, 388 (1993) ("Children are literally 'repossessed' by
their biological parents in the same manner as though they were property, capable of own-
ership, without independent human rights of their own."). A number of academic commen-
tators have voiced similar concerns. See, e.g., ELIZABemT BARTHoLr, FAMiLy BoNms:
ADopnrioN AND HmF PoLnncs OF PARENTING 50 (1993 (discussing ways in which adoption
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Children's advocates have not attacked parental rights with equal zeal
in all contexts, however. The cases in which they have typically urged limi-
tations on parental rights fall into two categories: One involves a conflict
between a parent and a mature child;2 the other involves a conflict between
a parent and some other adult who has played a parent-like role in the
child's life.3 In the latter group of cases - involving stepparents, lesbian
coparents, and other long-term caregivers - advocates have not typically
sought per se restrictions on parental rights; they have instead argued in
favor of a functional definition of parentage that would extend parental
status to adult care-givers without a biological or adoptive tie to the child.'
The Supreme Court has made tentative steps in the directions urged
by children's advocates. The Court has required the States to ensure that
parents do not overrule a mature minor's decision whether or not to bear a
child,' and has held that the fact of biological parentage is insufficient to
law subordinates children's interests to those of adults); Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expres-
sing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 294 (1988) (criticizing the current legal regime for en-
couraging parental possessiveness); John J. Musewicz, The Failure of Foster Care: Federal
Statutory Reform and the Child's Right to Permanence, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 633, 656 (1981)
("[I]t is clear that parental rights are all but absolute, even though they may conflict with the
child's need for permanence."); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?":
Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 997 (1992)
(asserting that Meyer and Pierce constitutionalized a narrow patriarchal vision of the child
as private property).
2. For representative examples of the literature on the rights of mature minors, see,
e.g., FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CHANoING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE (1982);
Hillary Rodham, Children Under the Law, 43 HARv. EDUC. REV. 487 (1973); Gary B.
Melton, Developmental Psychology and the Law: The State of the Art, 22 J. FAM. L. 445
(1983-1984); Martha Minow, Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to ChU-
dren's Rights, 9 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1986); Elizabeth S. Scott, Judgment and Reasoning
in Adolescent Decisionmaking, 37 VILL L. REV. 1607 (1992).
3. The traditional rule, both in custody and visitation disputes, defers to the parent
absent a showing of unfitness or abandonment. See, e.g., IRA M. ELLMAN, PAUL M. KURTZ,
& KATHARINE T. BARTLETT, FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 594-95 (2d ed. 1991)
and cases cited therein.
4. See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 1, at 314-15 (arguing in favor of custody decisionmak-
ing based on an assessment of which connections between parent and child are most impor-
tant); see also Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The
Need for Legal Alternatives when the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L.
REV. 879, 882 (1984) ("[T]he child's need for continuity in intimate relationships demands
that the state provide the opportunity to maintain important familial relationships with
more than one parent or set of parents."); Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have 71vo
Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and
Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEo. LJ. 459, 464 (1990) (proposing "expanding the defi-
nition of parenthood to include anyone who maintains a functional parental relationship
with a child when a legally recognized parent created that relationship with the intent that
the relationship be parental in nature"); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A
Child-Centered Perspective on Parents' Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747, 1758 (1993) (ar-
guing in favor of a functional definition of fatherhood).
5. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990).
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establish a full claim to parental rights.6 Parenthood confers, in the Court's
words, merely the
opportunity... to develop a relationship.. If [the parent] grasps
that opportunity and accepts some measure of responsibility for
the child's future he may.. .make uniquely valuable contributions
to the child's development. If he fails to do so, the Federal Con-
stitution will not automatically compel a state to listen to his opin-
ion of where the child's best interests lie.7
The perception that parents do make "uniquely valuable contribu-
tions" to their child's development has led children's advocates to favor
retention of traditional parental prerogatives in most contexts other than
that of the mature minor. The advocates have not sought more extensive
state interference with parental decisionmaking in intact families' nor
greater restrictions on the rights of parents who divorce or separate.9 In-
deed, the functional definition of parentage that the advocates have es-
poused would extend the number of adults who can claim parental
prerogatives.
This article focuses on the case of the foster child. This is an interest-
ing case because, in contrast to the general emphasis on relationship pro-
tection that has characterized advocacy on behalf of children, advocates
have here argued in favor of faster and easier termination of the parent-
child relationship. 10 A comparison of the divorce and foster care literature
illustrates the difference in approach: In divorce, the child's relationship
with a noncustodial parent is almost invariably described as a positive fac-
tor in her development that should be encouraged and facilitated; termina-
tion of the parental relationship is approved only in extreme cases where
6. Most of the cases have dealt with the rights of unmarried fathers. See, e.g., Quilloin
v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Michael H. v.
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
7. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. at 262.
8. See, e.g., JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD & ALBERT J. SoLuT, BEFORE THE
BEsT INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 193-94 (1979) [hereinafter BEFORE THE BEST frrERssTs]
(urging limitations on grounds for state intervention); Michael S. Wald, State Intervention on
Behalf of "Neglected" Children.: Standards for Removal of Children from Their Homes,
Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care and Termination of Parental Rights, 28
STAN. L. REV. 623, 690-92 (1976) (same).
9. See Marsha Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 STAN. L REv. 423, 453
n.141 (1983) [hereinafter Why Terminate?] (listing sources criticizing restrictions on rights of
noncustodial parents in divorce). For a noteworthy exception, see JOSEPH GOLDSTmN,
ANNA FREuD, & ALBERT J. SoLNiT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 39, 62
(2d ed. 1979) [hereinafter BEYOND THE BEST INrEREsTs].
10. See Why Terminate?, supra note 9, at 447 & 450-51 (describing a number of model
acts that would ease termination of parental rights). See also David J. Herring, Inclusion of
the Reasonable Efforts Requirement in Termination of Parental Rights Statutes: Punishing
the Child for the Failures of the State Child Welfare System, 54 U. Prrr. L REv. 139 (1992)
(arguing that efforts to reunite foster children with natural parents punishes them); Russ,
supra note 1, at 384-85 (urging lower standard of proof when termination proceeding is
brought by child).
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the parent threatens the child's health or safety. In foster care, however,
the noncustodial parent is typically seen as a threat to the child's relation-
ship with her foster parent or her opportunity to obtain adoptive parents;
termination of parental rights is urged whenever the child's return home
cannot be accomplished quickly.
The first part of the article analyzes whether the interests of foster
children are genuinely different from those of children separated from a
parent outside the foster care system, and whether a policy in favor of sev-
erance or preservation of the parent-child relationship best serves chil-
dren's interests. It concludes that the interests of foster children are not so
distinctive as to justify different legal principles and that the available evi-
dence supports a policy in favor of preservation of the parent-child rela-
tionship for all children.
The second part of the article analyzes why - despite the evidence -
children's advocates have tended to disfavor preservation of the parent-
child relationship for foster children. It concludes that the preference re-
sults from state fiscal incentives, the desires of adoptive parents, and the
symbolic benefits - legal rebirth and a fresh start - conferred on children
by adoption. It also analyzes the hidden costs of that preference.
I.
PARENTAL RIGHTS TERMINATION IN CONTEXT
A. The Evolution of the Modern Foster Care System
The first basis for parental rights termination was poverty, pure and
simple. Under the Elizabethan Poor Laws and their colonial counterparts,
children whose parents could not support them were indentured as appren-
tices; the parents of indentured children lost custody and all related paren-
tal rights."
During the nineteenth century, poverty remained virtually synony-
mous with neglect and permanent separation of parent and child continued
to serve as the preferred remedy for need.' But a new child protection
movement increasingly focused on the child's interests as a basis for par-
ent-child separation. The new child protection advocates urged separation
11. See, e.g., Judith Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child: A Reappraisal of
the State's Role in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEo. L.J. 887, 889-902 (1975)(provid-
ing historical description of child welfare practices and their relationship to public assistance
mechanisms); Jacobus ten Broek, California's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, De-
velopment, and Present Status, 16 STAN. L. REv. 257, 291-98 (1964) (same); Mason D.
Thomas, Jr., Child Abuse and Neglect: Historical Overview, Legal Matrix, and Social Per-
spectives, 50 N.C. L. REv. 293, 299 (1972) (tracing evolution of social attitudes and laws
relating to child abuse and neglect).
12. See, e.g., Areen, supra note 11 (discussing nineteenth century child protection
movement and the changes in child welfare practice that it instituted); Why Terminate?,
supra note 9, at 435-40 (same). For original documents from the nineteenth century child
protection movement, see 2 CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY His.
TORY (Robert H. Bremner ed., 1971).
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not to lower the state's public assistance outlay but, instead, to "rescue the
child from.., its contaminating surroundings and its faithless parents
"13
During the century since the child protection movement was born,
child protective practice has altered in many respects. Poverty is no longer
equated with neglect, and child welfare workers are expected to remedy
parental inadequacy rather than summarily terminating parental rights. 4
As a result of this shift in emphasis, foster care is now seen as a temporary
placement, to be accompanied by social casework aimed at achieving par-
ent-child reunification.'"
Child protective practice moved away from the "rescue" philosophy
for a variety of reasons. One was simply that many children could be re-
turned to their parents safely and quickly. Because children referred to
state child protection agencies still came almost exclusively from impover-
ished backgrounds, 6 intervention often resulted from a temporary crisis -
homelessness, for example - that did not mandate long-term placement.
1 7
Longitudinal studies of foster children conducted during the 1960s and 70s,
a period when reunification efforts were much less intensive than they are
today, reported that a third to a half of children who entered foster care
were returned home quite promptly."8 In these cases, child welfare officials
perceived no need for termination of parental ties.
13. David Dudley Field, The Child and the State, THE FORUbT I, 106-09 (1886), re-
printed in part in 2 CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN AMtERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 205
(Robert L Bremner ed., 1971). Field's appeal for child "rescue" focuses on the case of a
five year old boy who resides in a nineteen-by-fifteen foot tenement room where his parents
and their eight children "sleep, dress, wash, cook and eat."
He is a well-formed child, and as he turns his bright eyes upon you.., you see
that he has quick intelligence. Altogether he is such a child as a father should look
upon with pride and a true mother would press to her bosom. Yet the parents are
miserably poor, the father half the time out of work, and the mother wan with the
care of her family. This is not all. Father and mother both drink to excess, and
each is intoxicated as often at least as Saturday night comes round....
Id.
14. See, e.g., Marsha Garrison, Child Welfare Decisionmaking: In Search of the Least
Drastic Alternative, 75 GEo. LJ. 1745, 1751-54 (1987) [hereinafter Child Welfare Decision-
making] (describing transition in child welfare practice).
15. See, e.g., ALFRED KADUSHIN & JuDrm A. MARTIN, CHILD WELFARE SEIWvcEs
344-45 (4th ed. 1988) (describing current child welfare philosophy).
16. A 1969 foster care survey found that 84% of all families requesting placement were
from the two lowest socioeconomic groups. Martin Rein, Thomas E. Nutt, & Heather
Weiss, Foster Family Care: Myth and Reality, in CHILDREN AND DEcENT PEOPLE 24,27-29
(Alvin L. Schorr ed., 1974). Children in foster care still come almost exclusively from im-
poverished circumstances. See KADUSHIN & MARTIN, supra note 15, at 357; Child Welfare
Decisionmaking, supra note 14, at 1789 n.212.
17. See, e.g., KADUSHIN & MARTIN, supra note 15, at 358-62 (describing the factors that
lead to foster care placement and their frequency).
18. See, e.g., ELizABETH A. LAWDER, JOHN E. POLLIN, & ROBERTA G. ANDREWS, 185
FOSTER CHILDREN FIvE YEARS AFTER PLAcFWENr 16, tbL 2 (Children's Aid Society of
Pennsylvania, 1985) (finding that 56.2% of sample children admitted to foster care in 1978-
79 were discharged within 1 year, 70% within 2 years); MARK F. TESrA & ROBERT M.
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A second reason for the movement away from the rescue approach
was a change in the "market" for children. With the advent of child labor
laws around the turn of the century, state-paid foster care supplanted the
earlier system of "boarding-out" in which the child was expected to earn
his own keep. Adoption was not a realistic option for foster children dur-
ing this period because adoptive parents preferred newborns rather than
older children and the supply of newborn infants available for adoption
greatly exceeded demand. 19 Child welfare officials thus saw no benefits
either to the child or the public from a policy in favor of parental rights
termination; continued foster care placement, at exactly the same cost,
would result in either event.
B. The Child's Need for Permanence: A Newly Discovered Problem
Meets a Newly Available Solution
This consensus has shifted because the supply of newborn infants
available for adoption has dramatically declined. With fewer adoptable in-
fants, the adoption prospects of older foster children have markedly im-
proved.2' The changed adoption market has revived the appeal of the
nineteenth century rescue philosophy and produced a new reform move-
ment urging limitations on parental rights. These reform advocates have
urged that efforts to reunify parent and child should be intensive but time-
limited; if intensive efforts fail to permit reunification promptly, they advo-
cate swift termination of parental rights in order to "free" the child for
adoption.2'
The appeal of this solution has been bolstered by psychological attach-
ment, or bonding, theory. In its general form, attachment theory regards
GOERGE, POLICY AND RESOURCE FACTORS IN THE ACHIEVEMENT OF PERMANENCY FOR
FOSTER CHILDREN IN ILLINOIS 57 (1988) (reporting that during 1976-86 median duration of
Illinois foster care was one year); Shirley Jenkins, Duration of Foster Care: Some Relevant
Antecedent Variables, 46 CHILD WELFARE 45 (1967) (finding that 54% of sample foster chil-
dren left foster care within 3 months, 68% 1 year, and 75% 2 years). See also DAVID
FANSHEL & EUGENE B. SHINN, CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE: A LONGITUDINAL INVESTIGA-
TION 34, 116-21 (1978) (finding that 37% of sample foster children discharged from foster
care within 2 years and 60% within 5 years; children discharged within 3 months excluded
from study).
The primary outcome for foster children today is still reunification with family. Within
a year after placement some one-quarter to one-third of children in foster care are reunited
with family members; approximately one-half of children who leave the system will ulti-
mately return to their parents' home or to that of other relatives. See KADUSHIN &
MARTIN, supra note 15, at 417-19, tbls. 7-2, 7-3), 420-21 (summarizing reports).
19. See KADUSHIN & MARTIN, supra note 15, at 535-40 (describing changing adoption
scene); Why Terminate?, supra note 9, at 443-44 (same).
20. See, e.g., KADUSHIN & MARTIN, supra note 15, at 606 (reporting that in 1970 a child
over two was difficult to place for adoption, but that by 1980, white, nonhandicapped chil-
dren up to seven or eight years were placed for adoption with "relatively little difficulty.").
21. Some commentators have advocated termination after the child has been in foster
care for a year or two; others have urged termination when he has developed ties to a foster
parent. For a description of the various proposals, see Why Terminate?, supra note 9, at 447-
53.
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the making of emotional bonds as a basic feature of human nature; it thus
emphasizes the powerful influence on human development of the child's
first attachments, typically to his parents, as developmental models and
precursors of life experience2 Drawing on this theory, some prominent
scholars have argued that separation from a parent figure is sufficiently
damaging to a child's emotional development that, once an attachment is
formed, it should be disrupted for only the gravest reasons. 3 These theo-
reticians have urged parental rights termination whenever the child forms
an attachment to a foster parent.24 Others, drawing on their conclusions,
have argued in favor of prompt termination of parental rights, whether or
not the child has formed a relationship with a foster parent who wants to
keep her, in order to avoid the uncertainty and potential disruption of long-
term foster care.25
The modem movement to restrict parental rights thus seeks to avoid
discontinuity in the child's relationships with parental figures and to ensure
certainty in his placement status. Parental inadequacy is relevant to these
aims because that inadequacy necessitated placement and prevents the
child's immediate return home. But it is the child's need for an undis-
rupted parental relationship in a permanent home that provides the basis
for proposals to sever the parent-child bond at the end of a time-limited
period in foster care.
II.
TERMINATION VS. PRESERVATION OF PARENTAL CONTAcr.
WHICH SERVES CHILDREN'S INTERESBTS?
A. Mechanisms for Ensuring Permanence. Adoption and Its Alternatives
Although current proposals to speed parental rights termination aim
at providing permanence through adoptive placement, adoption is not the
22. For representative examples of the literature, see, e.g., CLINICAL I PCATIONS OF
ATACHMENT (Jay Belsky & Teresa M. Nezworski eds., 1988); JOHN BOwLBY, A SECURE
BASE: PARENT-CHILD ATTACHMENT AND HEALTHY Hu~iAN DEVELOPMENT 1-38, 119-36
(1988) [hereinafter BowLBY, A SECURE BASE]; JOHN BowLBY, THE MAKING AND BREAK-
ING OF AFECTIONAL BONDS 1-25 (1979) [hereinafter BowLEY, AFFECTIONAL BONDS]; THE
PLACE OF ATTACHMENT IN HUMAN BEHAVIOR (Colin M. Parkes & Joan Stevenson-Hinde
eds., 1982); Mary D. Salter Ainsworth, Patterns of Infant-Mother Attachment: Antecedents
and Effects on Development, 61 BuLL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 771 (1985); Mary Main & Donna
R. Weston, The Quality of the Toddler's Relationship to Mother and to Father: Related to
Conflict Behavior and the Readiness for Establishing New Relationships, 52 CHILD DEY. 932,
939 (1981); Michael Rutter, Resilience in the Face of Adversity: Protective Factors and
Resistance to Psychiatric Disorder, 147 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 598 (1985).
23. BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 9, at 32-35; BEFORE THE BEST INTER-
EsTs, supra note 8, at 3-14, 17-19, 193-95.
24. BEFORE rm BEST I'TERESTS, supra note 8, at 188-89, 194-95 (requiring termina-
tion of parental rights at request of foster parent who continuously cared for child for two
years).
25. See Why Terminate?, supra note 9, at 449-53 (describing several model standards
taking this approach).
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only method by which permanence could be achieved; the reform move-
ment may have emerged contemporaneously with the changed adoption
market, but its stated goals could be met without that alternative. Arrange-
ments that permanently transfer custody of the child from the state to the
foster parent, variously described as foster guardianship or "open" adop-
tion,2 6 would protect the child from removal to the same extent as a tradi-
tional adoptive placement.
These alternatives to traditional adoption offer children the an
equivalent level of emotional security; researchers have almost invariably
reported that children's expectations of permanence are based on evidence
of their caregiver's commitment and intentions, not legal labels.27 But the
alternatives do differ from traditional adoption in their effect on the par-
ent-child relationship. Traditional adoption, which legally transfers the
child from one family to another, requires complete severance of parental
ties while these other alternatives preserve the child's membership in his
biological family;28 the biological parent loses custody, but not the right to
continued visitation and contact.
26. The term "open adoption" was apparently coined by Baran, Pannor, and Sorosky
in 1976. They defined an open adoption as one "in which the birth parents meet the adop-
tive parents [and] relinquish all legal, moral, and nurturing rights to the child, but retain the
right to continuing contact and to knowledge of the child's whereabouts and welfare."
Annette Baran, Reuben Pannor, & Arthur D. Sorosky, Open Adoption, 21 Soc. WORK 97
(1976). Open adoption has been employed in some European countries, see Why Termi-
nate?, supra note 9, at 445 n.105, but most American states do not expressly authorize it.
Open adoptions thus remain fairly uncommon in the United States. For descriptions of
open adoptions, see KATHLEEN SILBER & PATRICIA M. DORNER, CHILDREN OF OPEN
ADOPTION AND THEIR FAMILIES (1990).
27. See, e.g., DAVID FANSHEL, COMPUTERIZED INFORMATION FOR CHILD WELFARE:
FOSTER CHILDREN AND THEIR FOSTER PARENTS 63 (1979) (indicating that the majority of a
group of children who had been in the same foster home for an average of six years thought
of their foster homes as their "real homes"); JANET LAHTI, KAREN GREEN, ARTHUR C.
EMLEN, JERRY ZADNY, QUENTIN D. CLARKSON, MARIE KUEHNEL, & JIM CASCIATO, A
FOLLOW-UP STUDY OF THE OREGON PROJECT 9.3 (1978)[hereinafter OREGON PROJECr]
(concluding that sample foster children's sense of permanence was not necessarily related to
the legal permanence of the placement); EUGENE A. WEINSTEIN, THE SELF-IMAoE OF THE
FOSTER CHILD 35 (1960) (describing child's expectation of placement permanence as
"highly realistic" and correlated with attitudes of caseworker and foster parents); Kathleen
Ohman Proch, Differences Between Foster Care and Adoption: Perceptions of Adopted Fos-
ter Children and Adoptive Foster Parents, 61 CHILD WELFARE 259, 265 (1982) (indicating
that only 8 of 29 former foster children could distinguish between foster care and adoption
and that most of the 8 remembered living in other foster homes); John Triseliotis, Growing
Up in Foster Care and After, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN FOSTER CARE AND ADOPTION 157
(John Triseliotis ed., 1980) (reporting that, over time, the foster child seems to become "in-
distinguishable from other members of the caretaking family"). But see John Triseliotis &
Malcolm Hill, Contrasting Adoption, Foster Care, and Residential Rearing, in THE PsycHoL.
OGY OF ADOPTION 112 (David M. Brodzinsky & Marshall D. Schechter eds., 1990) (report-
ing that children in long-term foster care experienced "an element of anxiety about the
impermanency of their position as foster children").
28. An adoption decree generally "relieve[s] the natural parents of all parental rights
and responsibilities, and ... terminate[s] all legal relationships between the adopted individ-
ual and his relatives, including his natural parents, so that the adopted individual thereafter
is a stranger to his former relatives for all purposes including inheritance ... ." REv. UNIF.
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Proposals to speed termination of parental rights in order to ensure
permanence through adoption thus cannot be described as a simple issue of
children's best interests; other alternatives could ensure permanence that
also preserve the parent-child relationship. Justification for a policy favor-
ing adoption over those alternatives must be based on the evidence demon-
strating that severance of parental ties better serves children's interests
than does preservation.
B. Foster Care and Divorce: Are They Comparable?
With one notable exception,29 children's advocates have favored sever-
ance of the parent-child relationship in foster care and preservation in di-
vorce. But from the child's perspective, divorce and long-term foster care
placement are not obviously different.3 0 In both contexts, the child's rela-
tionship with a noncustodial parent is maintained through visitation and
sporadic contact rather than a day-to-day relationship. In both contexts,
the child has another parent, or parent-figure, who provides day-to-day
care and to whom the child is likely to be deeply attached. In both con-
texts, the day-to-day parent and the noncustodial parent may cooperate or,
alternatively, express hostility and compete for the child's love.
Parents whose children enter foster care are less likely to exhibit capa-
ble parenting than those who divorce,3 1 but the available evidence does not
suggest that parental capacity affects the strength of the parent-child rela-
tionship. As John Bowlby, one of our foremost developmental psycholo-
gists, has put it, "[t]he attachment of children to parents who by all
ordinary standards are very bad parents is a never-ceasing source of won-
der to those who seek to help them."3 2
ADOPTION ACT § 14(a)(1), 9 U.L.A. 44 (1988). In recent years, some states have enacted
special provisions for adoptions by stepparents or other relatives which do not terminate
inheritance rights. See eg., N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 117(1)(d) (McKinney 1988).
29. BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 9, at 62.
30. For a more detailed comparison, see Why Terminate?, supra note 9, at 455-57.
31. Inadequate parenting is not unique to foster care cases, however. One study of a
sample middle-class divorce population reports that 15% of sampled divorced fathers suf-
fered from a severe psychiatric illness, 40% of father-child relationships were "profoundly
troubled," and 20% of sample children moderately or intensely feared their fathers. JUDITH
S. WALLERSTEIN & JOAN BERLIN KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP: How CHILDREN AND
PARENTS COPE wrrIH DIVORCE 253 (1980).
32. JOHN BOWLBY, MATERNAL CARE AND MENTAL HEALTH 120 (1952) [hereinafter
BOwLBY, MATERNAL CARE] ("Even when they are with kindly foster-parents these chil-
dren feel their roots to be in the homes where, perhaps, they have been neglected and ill-
treated, and [they] keenly resent criticisms directed against their parents."). See also
JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE, SECOND CHANCES: MEN, WOMEN, AND
CHILDREN A DECADE AFTER DIVORCE 234 (1989) ("Most children do not give up on their
biological fathers, even if they are ne'er-do-wells who have abandoned them without a
backward glance... [they] construct a credible image of the father they never knew from
any scraps of information that they can collect and tend to idealize him in the process.");
Sherwin S. Radin, The Psychological Parent Concept in Contested Custody Cases, 11 . Psy-
cHIATRY & L. 503, 512-13 (1983) (stating that the psychological parent may be an unfit
parent).
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In sum, while foster care and divorce are clearly different and we lack
research providing direct comparisons, there is much to suggest that, from
the perspective of the child, these two situations present more similarities
than differences. In each case, a parental attachment must be maintained
through visitation rather than day-to-day contact.
C. Do Absent Parents Matter?
Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert Solnit, a distinguished
group of coauthors who have served as the permanence movement's lead-
ing theoreticians, concur in this assessment. They stress the strength of
children's attachment even to inadequate parents 33 and argue that divorce
and foster care are sufficiently similar, from the child's perspective, so as to
mandate consistent legal rules.34 But, in contrast to what one would expect
based on these premises, they urge legal standards that would terminate
the visitation rights of a noncustodial parent in both the divorce and foster
care context. The basis for this approach is the claim that children suffer
"devastating consequences" from "maintaining contact with two psycho-
logical parents who are not in positive contact with each other... A 'visit-
ing' or 'visited' parent has little chance to serve as a true object for love,
trust, and identification, since this role is based on his being available on an
uninterrupted day-to-day basis."
35
While Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit make this claim as a basis for pro-
posed legal standards that would terminate the noncustodial parent's visita-
tion rights in both divorce and foster care, children's advocates have used
the argument selectively. None has publicly favored parental rights termi-
nation in divorce; most have used the claim to justify parental rights termi-
nation for foster children.
But while there is evidence to support a consistent approach for di-
vorce and foster care, current psychological research fails to support the
claim that custodial parents are the only ones who count.36 Although a
wealth of data, from diverse sources and theoretical schools, has confirmed
the importance of the parent-child relationship as a determinant of the
33. BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 8, at 193-94 (describing limited grounds
for state intervention).
34. BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 9, at 62 (proposing application of an
identical standard "[w]hether the problem arises in separation, divorce, adoption, neglecting
parent, foster care, or even juvenile delinquency proceedings"). Other things being equal,
Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit would permit the court to award custody to the parent most
willing to permit visitation. Id. at 118.
35. Id. at 38 ("Loyalty conflicts are common and normal under such conditions and
may have devastating consequences by destroying the child's positive relationships to both
parents.").
36. Researchers, studying both intact and separated families, have typically reported
that high levels of conflict between parents are correlated with psychological problems in
children. See infra note 50 and sources cited therein.
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child's personality, resilience, and relationships with others,37 that research
has also established that children are capable of maintaining many emo-
tional bonds simultaneously. The strength of a child's attachments is not
subject to precise measurement, and a strong attachment with one parent
figure does not mean that attachments to other parent figures are weak.38
Decades of research have also established that a child's ties to his par-
ents do not lose their importance simply as a result of separation or loss of
day-to-day contact.3 9 "The parent-child tie... can be greatly distorted [but
it] is not to be expunged by mere physical separation. '40 Not even the
substitution of a parent replacement, for example a stepparent, renders the
absent parent unimportant. Judith Wallerstein, one of our best-known di-
vorce researchers, reports that only one child in a sample of fifty-five chil-
dren with stepfathers fully substituted stepfather for father; for the
remainder of the children, she concluded, stepparents were less powerful
determinants of emotional well-being than the absent biological parent.41
37. For representative examples of the literature, see, e.g., BoWLBY, A SECURE BASF,
supra note 22, at 171-80; MARGARET S. MAHLER, FRED PINE & Atmu BERGMAN, THE Psy-
CHOLOGICAL BIRTH OF THE HUzAN INFANT (1975); SciEmnic FOUNDATIONS OF DEVEL-
OPMNENTAL PSYCHIATRY (Michael C. Rutter ed., 1980); J. Glen H. Elder, Avshalom Caspi, &
Geraldine Downey, Problem Behavior and Family Relationships: Life Course and In-
tergenerational Themes, in Huw, N DEVELOPMENT AND THE LIFE COURSEL MULTIDISCI-
PLINARY PERSPECTIVES 293 (Aage B. Sorensen, Franz E. Weinert, & Lonnie R. Sherrod
eds., 1986); Seymour Epstein, The Self-Concept: A Review and the Proposal of an Integrated
Theory of Personality, in PERSONALITY: BASIC ASPECTS AND CURRENT RESEARCH (Ervin
Staub ed., 1980). See also infra notes 45-48 and sources cited therein.
38. See, e.g., MICHAEL C. RUrrER, MATERNAL DEPRIVATION RESSESSED 141-42 (2d
ed. 1981) (reviewing research and reporting that "[a]ll studies have shown that most chil-
dren develop multiple attachments" and noting that multiple attachments tend to have simi-
lar functions although different levels of intensity); Everett Waters & Donna M. Noyes,
Psychological Parenting vs. Attachment Theory: The Child's Best Interests and the Risks in
Doing the Right Things for the Wrong Reasons, 12 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 505,
509, 513-14 (1983-1984) (describing the "ease with which new attachment relationships can
form in infancy and early childhood" and the fact that "multiple attachments are the rule
rather than the exception"); Main & Weston, supra note 22 at 932 (describing variable pat-
terns of attachment between young children and their fathers and mothers).
39. For descriptions of the research findings, see RurrrER, supra note 38; Peggy C.
Davis, Use and Abuse of the Power to Sever Family Bonds, 12 N.Y.U. Rsv. L & Soc.
CHANGE 557, 563-72 (1983-1984); Child Welfare Decisionmaking, supra note 14, at 1777-86;
Why Terminate?, supra note 9, at 455-60; Waters & Noyes, supra note 38. See also Penny
Ruff Johnson, Carol Yoken, & Ron Voss, Family Foster Care Placement: The Child's Per-
spective, 74 CHILD WELFARE 959, 963, 967 (1995) (reporting that all but 3 of 95 children
aged 11-14 who had been in foster care for between 6 months and 2 years indicated that
they missed their families and that 56% reported "they miss their parents most of the
time").
40. BowLBY, MATERNAL CARE, supra note 32, at 114. See also WALLERSTEIN &
BLAKCESLEE, supra note 32, at 234 ("Children do not dismiss...[a parent] just because there
has been a divorce.. .[That parent remains] a part of the child's emotional life, a factor in
the child's self-esteem, self-image, aspirations, and relationships with the opposite sex.").
41. WALLERSTEIN & BLAKESLEE, supra note 32, at 234, 246-50. Most of the sample
children nonetheless described their relationships with stepfathers positively. Wallerstein
reports that 90% of the younger children in the study felt that their lives had been enhanced
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An absent parent remains important to the child because the parental
relationship is a primary source of the child's identity and self-esteem. 2 As
one foster child poignantly put it, "if your mother doesn't love you, who
will?"' 43 The parent also represents the child's history and his unique bio-
logical inheritance. Even children adopted at birth often wish to learn
about their biological parents; some go to extraordinary lengths to obtain
information about their origins, family history, and the reasons for their
relinquishment."
Rather than resolving the child's relationship with a parent from
whom the child is separated, loss of contact thus has the potential conse-
quence of making such a resolution far more difficult. Parental absence
may enhance the child's tendency toward self-blame or exaggeration; the
child may idealize the absent parent, blame herself for disruption in the
relationship, or exaggerate the parent's flaws.45 Such extreme responses
impede the child's ability to effectively mourn her loss and maintain her
self-esteem.46 Loss of contact may also inhibit the child's ability to form a
realistic assessment of her situation and current, realistic relationships.47
by their stepfathers and two-thirds felt able to love step-fathers and fathers at the same
time. Id. at 247.
42. See, e.g., STANLEY COOPERSMITH, THE ANTECEDENTS OF SELF-ESTEEM (1967) (an-
alyzing relationship between parental attitudes and practices and their children's self-es-
teem); Ner Littner, The Importance of Natural Parents to the Child in Placement, 54 CHILD
WELFARE 175, 178-81 (1975) (discussing advantages to foster children of contacts with natu-
ral parents); Patricia G. Morisey, Continuum of Parent-Child Relationship in Foster Care, in
FOSTER CARE IN QUESTION: A NATIONAL REASSESSMENT BY TwENTY-oNE EXPERTS 148
(Helen D. Stone ed., 1970) (discussing theoretical basis for maintaining foster child's rela-
tionship with parents).
43. Katherine G. Levine, The Placed Child Examines the Quality of Parental Care, 67
CHILD WELFARE 301, 306 (1988).
44. See DAVID M. BRODZINSKY, MARSHALL D. SCHECHTER, & ROBIN M. HENIO, BE.
ING ADOPTED: THE LIFELONG SEARCH FOR SELF 71-82, 101-10 (1992) (reporting that even
a child adopted at birth feels a sense of loss for the biological family); Marshall D. Schechter
& Doris Bertocci, The Meaning of the Search, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOvrION 62 (David
M. Brodzinsky & Marshall D. Schechter eds., 1990) (reporting that adopted persons search
for essential connections to their past).
45. For both case histories and theoretical perspectives, see, e.g., BOWLBY, MATERNAL
CARE, supra note 32, at 124-25; Beatrice L. Garrett, Developing the Conviction in the Foster
Child that He Is Worthwhile, in FOSTER CARE IN QUEsTION, supra note 42, at 16, 22; Levine,
supra note 43, at 304-06; Littner, supra note 42, at 178-81; Ellen R. Rest & Kenneth W.
Watson, Growing Up in Foster Care, 63 CHILD WELFARE 291, 298-304 (1984); Jonathan M.
Stein & Andr6 P. Derdeyn, The Child in Group Foster Care, 19 AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCI-IIA.
TRY 90, 92-93 (1980). See also WALLERSTEIN & KELLY, supra note 31, at 218, 256 (describ-
ing similar tendencies among children of divorce); Elinor B. Rosenberg & Thomas M.
Homer, Birthparent Romances and Identity Formation in Adopted Children, 61 AM. J. OR.
THOPSYCHIATRY 70 (1991) (describing similar issues in development of adopted children).
46. See ERNA FURMAN, A CHILD'S PARENT DIES: STUDIES IN CHILDHOOD BEREAVE.
MENT 46-48 (1974) (concluding that healthy mourning following a loss through separation
poses particular difficulties for children, which are worsened by making the separation to-
tal); see also Levine, supra note 43, at 302-08; Littner, supra note 42, at 178-79; Stein &
Derdeyn, supra note 45, at 92-93.
47. See, e.g., Levine, supra note 43, at 306-08 (describing case studies of foster children
whose unresolved feelings of loyalty to parents impeded development of relationships with
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I do not mean to suggest that biological parents are the only influence
upon their child's personal development or the only sources of her identity
and self-esteem. Psychological research has confirmed, again and again,
that it is the quality of the child's care over time that is the most important
determinant of well-being." But that research has also confirmed that ab-
sent parents remain important to their children. It has confirmed the heal-
ing effects of continued parental contact. It has confirmed that our efforts
to deny the power of an absent parent only hinder the child's ability to
effectively mourn her loss.
Visitation with a noncustodial parent is not, of course, invariably bene-
ficial to children. Foster children placed as infants who have never exper-
ienced more than sporadic office visits with their biological parents may
not profit significantly from continued contact.49 Some abusive parents
pose real risks to their child's physical safety; some mentally ill parents may
be incapable of meaningful interaction. Exposure to serious conflict be-
tween parents - in an intact or separated family - has also been found to
pose risks to a child's emotional development.50 But there is no reason to
foster families); Stein & Derdeyn, supra note 45, at 92-93 (reporting that foster parents and
caseworker were often viewed by the foster child as persecutors who had stolen her from
loving parents, and that this situation more likely to arise when visitation was disallowed or
limited).
48. See e.g., BowLBY, A SEcuRE BASE, supra note 22, at 171-72 (summarizing re-
search and concluding that "it is necessary to think of each personality as moving through
life along some developmental pathway, with the particular pathway followed always being
determined by the interaction of the personality as it has so far developed and the environ-
ment in which it is then finding itself"); RurrER, supra note 38, at 72-73, 109-113, 124-25
(summarizing research and concluding that "[a]ltogether the results strongly suggest that it
is the quality of relationships which matter"); Child Welfare Decisionmaking, supra note 14,
at 1778-80 (summarizing and describing research); see also Antonia T. Bifulco, George IV.
Brown, & Tirril D. Harris, Childhood Loss of Parent, Lack of Adequate Parental Care and
Adult Depression: A Replication, 12 J. AFEcrivE DIsoamEits 115 (1987) (summarizing
study tracing connections between adult depression and childhood experience).
49. The same applies, of course, to children whose parents divorced while they were
infants.
50. See, e.g., WALLERSTEIN & KELLY, supra note 31, at 49, 70-71 (reporting that chil-
dren experience loyalty conflict and unhappiness as a result of parental discord); Jay Belsky,
Lise Younglade, Michael Rovine, & Brenda Volling, Patterns of Marital Change and Parent-
Child Interaction, 53 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 487 (1991) (reporting that the quality of father-
child relationship is frequently correlated with the quality of the father-mother relation-
ship); E. Mavis Hetherington, Martha Cox, & Roger Cox, Play and Social Interaction in
Children Following Divorce, 35 J. Soc. IssuEs 26 (1979); Janet R Johnston, Children's Ad-
justment in Sole Custody Compared to Joint Custody Families and Principles for Custody
Decision Making, 33 FAM. & CONCILIATION Crs. REv. 415, 420-21 (1995) (reviewing re-
search and concluding that "ongoing and unresolved conflict between divorced parents has
detrimental effects on children, especially boys" and that in these cases substantial amounts
of access to both parents is associated with poorer adjustment); James L Peterson &
Nicholas Zill, Marital Disruption, Parent-Child Relationships, and Behavior Problems in
Children, 48 J. MARRIAGE & FAm. 295 (1986) (discussing correlations between parent's
post-divorce relationship and children's behavior); Marsha Kline, Janet R. Johnston, &
Jeanne M. Tschann, The Long Shadow of Marital Conflict" A Model of Children's
Postdivorce Adjustment, 53 J. MARRIAGE & FAi. 297 (1991) (discussing negative effects of
parental conflict on children's postdivorce adjustment). But see Joseph U. Healy, Janet E.
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suppose that serious conflict between biological and foster (or adoptive)
parent is more likely than between divorced parents. Nor are most parents
of foster children abusive or incapable of interaction.
Given the importance and nonexclusivity of parental attachments, the
endurance of those attachments without day-to-day contact or adequate
parenting, and the negative effects of prolonged loss of contact, it is not
surprising that researchers studying both children of divorce and foster
care have typically reported benefits from parental visitation;51 no re-
searcher, comparing children who have retained contact with a noncus-
todial parent and those who have not, has reported that the visited children
are worse off. While we do not yet know the extent to which the benefits
of parental contact persist into adulthood52 and divorce researchers have
less consistently reported clear advantages from parental visitation than
have their counterparts studying foster children, 3 the research supports
current divorce laws which deny the custodial parent the right both to uni-
laterally curtail visitation and to "discard" the noncustodial parent when a
stepparent becomes available.5 4 It could and, one would think, should
Malley & Abigail J. Stewart, Children and Their Fathers After Parental Separation, 60 Am. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 531 (1990) (reporting that frequent visits with noncustodial father were
linked to fewer child behavior problems when level of conflict between parents was high).
51. For recent reviews of the divorce research, see, e.g., Andrew J. Cherlin, Frank F.
Furstenberg Jr., P. Lindsay Chase-Landsdale, Kathleen E. Kiernan, Philip K. Robins,
Donna R. Morrison, & Julien 0. Teitler, Longitudinal Studies of Effects of Divorce on Chil-
dren in Great Britain and the United States, 252 SCIENCE 1386 (1991) [hereinafter Longitudi-
nal Studies]; Joan B. Kelly, Current Research on Children's Post-Divorce Adjustment: No
Simple Answers, 31 FAM. & CONCILIATION Crs. REV. 29 (1993). For a description of the
foster care research, see Why Terminate?, supra note 9, at 461-69 (summarizing reports).
52. See FRANK F. FURSTENBERG & ANDREW J. CHERLIN, DIVIDED FAMILIES: WHAT
HAPPENS TO CHILDREN WHEN PARENTS PART 72-73 (1991) (reporting, based on National
Survey of Children (NSC) data, that among a sample of young adults who had experienced
divorce as children, those "who had retained stable, close ties to their fathers were neither
more nor less successful than those who had had low or inconsistent levels of contact and
intimacy with their fathers"); TRUDY FESTINGER, No ONE EVER ASKED Us ... A POST-
SCRIPT TO FOSTER CARE 95-96 (1983) (finding that in sample of young adult former foster
children discharged from family homes, contact with relatives generally had no impact on
"their view of themselves and their lives" at time of interview in young adulthood while, for
those discharged from group care, contact with kin was associated with "more positive ap-
praisal of themselves and their lives"); ROSALIE B. ZIMMERMAN, FOSTER CARE IN RETRO-
SPECT 91 (1982) (finding, in study of adult subjects who had been in foster care, that those
who had been in long-term care were more frequently represented in adequately function-
ing group if visited by parents; in total group of former foster children, frequent parental
visiting was associated with low adult functioning but "these were the youngsters who for
the most part were returned to the custody of the natural parents, and it is that fact rather
than the visiting itself that is thought to be truly associated with outcome").
53. See, e.g., FURSTENBERG & CHERLIN, supra note 52, at 72-73; Kelly, supra note 51,
at 37-41; Longitudinal Studies, supra note 51.
54. Denial of visitation after divorce is extremely rare. In one sample of 426 divorce
decrees only nine failed to grant visitation. W.P.C. Phear, J.C. Beck, B.B. Hauser, S.C.
Clark, & R.A. Whitney, An Empirical Study of Custody Agreements. Joint Versus Sole
Legal Custody, 11 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 419, 428 (1983). For descriptions of the legal stan-
dards governing parental visitation rights after divorce, see, e.g., Steven L. Novinson, Post-
Divorce Visitation: Untying the Triangular Knot, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 121. Visitation rights
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support a similar approach in foster care:"5 As adoption alternatives can
resolve the problem of placement impermanence while preserving the ben-
efits of parental visitation, this option would appear to be preferable to
traditional adoption. This approach would have the added advantage of
conformity with legal practice in divorce, the most common source of fam-
ily disruption.5 6 And when foster parents are unwilling to adopt, this ap-
proach may even offer more permanence; if the child must leave beloved
foster parents, the "permanent" home she has been offered exposes her to
yet another loss, another period of being on trial, another potential
rejection. 7
When I wrote on this issue in greater detail a decade ago to urge that
foster guardianship or "open" adoption should become the norm for chil-
dren in long-term foster care,58 the evidence on the advantages of preserv-
ing the parental relationship was sufficiently strong that I believed these
survive the custodial parent's remarriage and, in most states, are not contingent upon pay-
ment of child support obligations. See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAw OF Domsnc
RELATIONS 731-32, 812 (2d ed. 1988). The child's interest in continued visitation may even
serve as a basis for denying the custodial parent the right to move. For descriptions and
criticisms of various state standards governing relocation, see, e.g., Katherine C. Sheehan,
Post-divorce Child Custody and Family Relocation, 9 HARv. WOMEN's L.. 135 (1986); Joan
G. Wexler, Rethinking the Modification of Child Custody Decrees, 94 YALE LJ. 757 (1985).
55. One pair of experts, after reviewing the evidence on parental visitation following
divorce, note that
despite the mixed evidence, the idea that continuing contact with fathers makes a
difference to a child's psychological well-being is so plausible and so seemingly
grounded in theories of child development that one is reluctant to discount it...
We remain convinced that when parents are able to cooperate in childrearing after
a divorce and when fathers are able to maintain an active and supportive role,
children will be better off in the long run...
FURSTENBERG & CHERLIN, supra note 52, at 73.
56. Divorce standards are also typically applied where a nonparent obtains custody
outside the foster care system. For descriptions of case law and statutes governing parent/
third party custody and visitation disputes, see, e.g., Robert J. Levy, Rights and Responsibili-
ties for Extended Family Members? 27 FAm. LQ. 191 (1993); Richard S. Victor, Michael A.
Robbins, & Scott Bassett, Statutory Review of Third-Party Rights Regarding Custody, Wsita-
tion, and Support, 25 F.Am. L. Q. 19 (1991); Lucy S. McGough & Lawrence M. Shindell,
Coming of Age: The Best Interests of the Child Standard in Parent-Third Party Custody
Disputes, 27 EMORY L.I. 209 (1978).
57. See James A. Rosenthal, Outcomes of Adoption of Children with Special Needs, 3
THE FuTURE OF CHILDREN 77, 78-84 (1993) (reporting that, as special needs adoptions in-
creased during the 1970s and 80s, so did rate of disruption; studies report highly disparate
findings on disruption rates, ranging from 2% to 53%). See also Richard P. Barth &
Marianne Berry, Outcomes of Child Welfare Services under Permanency Planning, 61 Soc.
SERv. REv. 71, 76 (1987) (reporting that increased efforts to place former foster children
produced increased disruption rate and noting disparate rates of disruption).
The open adoption approach might also facilitate the provision of follow-up services to
the child and family. Commentators have noted that "serious difficulties have arisen be-
cause of the lack of sufficient follow-up services offered by... the adoption agency... Even
when families have adopted disturbed or handicapped children, it has been assumed that
good parenting would, for the most part, overcome any trauma the child has undergone ...
This has proven illusory for many families." KADUSHIN & MARTIN, supra note 15, at 636.
58. Why Terminate?, supra note 9.
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alternatives would indeed become far more popular. The use of these op-
tions has, in fact, increased. But, in contrast to what one would expect
from an analysis of foster children's needs and interests, adoption remains
the preferred alternative.59 The final question I wish to address is why.
III.
WHY HAS ADOPTION BEEN PREFERRED TO ALTERNATIVES
THAT PRESERVE THE PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP?
A. Termination vs. Preservation of Parental Contact. Practical
Constraints and Confluent Adult Interests
One reason for preferring adoption over continued foster care is their
comparative cost. Foster care is expensive. If the child is adopted by par-
ents who can afford to pay his keep, he costs the state nothing, and even
subsidized adoption is cheaper than foster care.60 But while the savings
that adoption can achieve have undoubted contributed to its popularity,
both open adoption and foster guardianship could achieve these same
results.
Traditional adoption is a widely recognized legal concept while open
adoption and foster guardianship are new approaches, with less certain
procedures and results.61 This fact may bear some responsibility for the
preference accorded traditional adoption, but guardianship is a well devel-
oped concept outside the foster care context and open adoption has been
routinely employed in many European countries. 62
A more important reason why traditional adoption has been preferred
to its alternatives, I suspect, is its greater appeal to prospective adoptive
parents. While the diminished supply of adoptable infants has indeed ex-
panded the adoption market so that many previously unadoptable children
59. A preference for adoption over guardianship or long-term foster care is now man-
dated by the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 670-671 (1994). The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act does not specify
whether traditional adoption should be preferred to open adoption.
60. See Irving Schulman & Richard E. Behrman, Adoption: Overview and Major Rec-
ommendations, 3 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 8 (1993) (comparing foster care rate and adop-
tion subsidy rate in several states and concluding that "in virtually all states the adoption
subsidy rate is significantly lower than the foster care rate for the same child"). The foster
care rate does not take into account the administrative expenses of foster care and thus
underestimates the cost differential. See also MAYOR'S COMM'N FOR THE FOSTER CARE OF
CHILDREN, CITY OF NEW YORK, CHILD WELFARE AT A CROSSROADS: RETHINKING, REDI-
RECTING, REINVESTING 65 (1993) [hereinafter CHILD WELFARE AT A CROSSROADS] (esti-
mating one year savings to New York City from 2,443 foster child adoptions in 1992-93 of
$18 million).
61. Because an open adoption preserves the opportunity for continued contact and
visitation, there may be litigation over visitation enforcement that would not occur in a
traditional adoption. For a detailed discussion of how open adoption laws might be struc-
tured to reduce such litigation maximally, see Why Terminate?, supra note 9, at 479-81, 496.
62. See Why Terminate?, supra note 9, at 445 n.105 (listing countries offering open
adoptions).
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are now in demand, former foster children (typically older, nonwhite, often
with special needs) 63 are still not the easiest of children to place. Although
the pool of potential adoptive parents has diversified over the last decade,
many still seek to adopt because of infertility and prefer a child who is
unencumbered with another family.
The comparative costs of adoption vs. foster care, the altered adoption
market, and the interests of prospective adoptive parents undoubtedly
have a interactive effect. Most of the adoptive parents who might save the
state money want a child that is exclusively their own. Termination of pa-
rental rights followed by adoption thus meets both the fiscal needs of the
state and the desires of a well-organized and sympathetic adult interest
group.
B. The Cultural Symbolism of Adoption
In addition to serving confluent state and adult interests, adoption of-
fers powerful symbolic benefits to children. An adoption order provides a
legal rebirth - complete with a new name and identity - into a new
family.65 The child who is adopted is thus legally reincarnated. Because
adoption symbolically grants the child the good parents and good life she
previously lacked, that legal reincarnation has a redemptive quality not un-
like a baptismal or conversion experience.
The symbolic benefits conferred by adoption are magnified by the
stigma attached to foster care status. Foster care is a form of public assist-
ance that denotes family failure and entails ongoing state supervision."
The parents of children in foster care placement are almost invariably from
the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder,67 while adoptive parents are typi-
cally middle-class; s intact, two-parent families are almost as common
among adoptive parents as they are rare among those whose children go
into placement.69 Adoption thus offers a permanent improvement in socio-
economic status in a socially preferred family structure.
63. See, e.g., Kathy S. Stolley, Statistics on Adoption in the United States, 3 THaE FuTuRE
OF CHILDREN 26,34 (1993) (reporting that in 1988 median age of children awaiting adoptive
placement was 8.3 years, 39.1% were black, 63.5% had one or more special needs, and
almost 55% had been waiting two or more years to be placed for adoption).
64. For a description of the current pool of adoptive parents, see Judith K. McKenzie,
Adoption of Children with Special Needs, 3 THE FuTuRE OF CHILDREN 62, 70-72 (1993).
65. Traditionally adoption severs all legal relationships between the child and his bio-
logical relatives. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
66. Foster children sometimes report embarrassment and other negative feelings asso-
dated with their foster care status. See Rest & Watson, supra note 45, at 299-304; Triseliotis
& Hill, supra note 27, at 113-16.
67. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
68. See, eg., Stoley, supra note 63, at 38 (stating that unrelated adoptions occur more
frequently among whites and those of higher socioeconomic status).
69. See, e.g., id. at 37 (indicating that "almost all adopting parents are married at the
time of the adoption" but noting increased tendency of single parents to adopt during
1980s).
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The redemption that adoption confers upon the child is also depen-
dent upon the severance of ties with her biological parents; rebirth necessi-
tates the death of past identity and familial bonds. This aspect of adoption
symbolism is readily apparent in popular press accounts of the case of
Gregory K., the much-publicized foster child who sought to "divorce" his
mother so that he could be adopted by his foster parents:70 "When the
ruling was handed down, the boy once known as Gregory K. jumped from
his seat, [and] hugged his new mother... At last the boy.., could start to
put his difficult past behind him," People magazine recounts.7 1
The "fresh start" offered by adoption may even confer psychological
benefits on older foster children like Gregory K. who have the capacity to
distinguish the legal consequences of adoption and foster care and who
have coped with separation and loss by rejecting their biological parents.
While most researchers have reported that foster children's perceptions of
permanence and level of well-being are not tied to their placement status,2
some have reported that adoption nonetheless conveys psychic benefits.
These researchers found that
[a]Ithough the children felt confident of their foster parents' love,
they were conscious that their full family membership was
70. Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So.2d 780 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993). Because Gregory K.
was an older child, his case also raises the issue of a mature minor's decisionmaking
prerogatives.
71. Bill Hewitt, The Home of His Choice: "Divorcing" His Birth Mother, Gregory K.,
Changes His Name and His Family, PEOPLE, Oct. 12, 1992, at 57. The trial judge similarly
emphasized Gregory's altered identity. According to news accounts, after approving the
adoption, the judge declared, "Gregory, you're the son of Mr. and Mrs. Russ at this mo-
ment." Charles Jaco, Gregory K. Wins a Landmark Case, (Cable News Network, Sept. 25,
1992).
72. See OREGON PROJECr, supra note 27, at 9.3 (finding that whether child was in le-
gally permanent placement, adoption, returned home, or legally temporary foster care made
"very little difference in his level of adjustment and health at the time of the interview");
Edith Fein, Anthony N. Maluccio, V. Jane Hamilton & Darryl E. Ward, After Foster Care:
Outcomes of Permanency Planning for Children, 62 CHILD WELFARE 485, 508-12 (1983)
(finding that placement status-returned to family, adoption, or permanent foster home-
was not significantly correlated with family adjustment, emotional/developmental function,
child behavior, or school functioning after 12 to 16 months). But see Triseliotis & Hill, supra
note 27, at 107 (claiming that "those growing up adopted, even if placed when older, appear
in adulthood to have a stronger sense of self and to function more adequately at the per-
sonal, social, and economic level compared with those who were formerly fostered"). One
study by Michael Bohman & Soren Sigvardsson, Outcomes in Adoption, in THE PSYCHOL-
OGY OF ADOPTION, supra note 44, at 93, 104-06, is extremely difficult to characterize be-
cause of the researchers' failure to control for socioeconomic status and adoptive parent
preparation. The researchers found that "Group I" children (adopted at birth into families
of "fairly good and stable social and economic standing" who had been "thoroughly pre-
pared for their role as new parents") were, at age 15, at no greater risk of school failure and
maladjustment than a peer control group, while "Group II" children (placed in infancy, with
the tacit understanding that adoption was the goal of placement, with foster parents lacking
"the higher status of the adoptive parents" and "who were not specially prepared for their
task as nonbiological parents") demonstrated greater risk of school failure and maladjust-
ment than peer control group; 70% of Group II children were adopted by foster parents
before age 7).
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brought into question in the eyes of outsiders by their different
names and by experiences they had to undergo which other chil-
dren did not. Therefore, they saw adoption as bringing about
some immediate tangible gains such as not having to undergo
medicals or receive social work visits... [and] not having to ex-
plain to friends and teachers why they had a different surname
from that of their adoptive parents... The adoption order was
[also] a symbolic act creating a deep, satisfying psychological feel-
ing for them... It conveyed to them a sense of security and be-
longing, the right to feel as part of the family and to call the foster
parents, "parents."'73
Gregory K. thus took not only the surname of his adoptive family but a
new first name as well; by becoming Shawn Russ, he emphasized both his
break with an unhappy past and his dream of a new and better future.74
It is natural that children's advocates should wish to confer these bene-
fits - a sense of belonging, the right to feel part of the family, a symbolic
rebirth into a happier, more secure life - upon deprived children. 75 It is
these intangible, and generally unexamined, aspects of adoption that have,
in my view, ensured its appeal.76
73. Triseliotis & Hill, supra note 27, at 114.
74. A name change marks "an important breach... between the individual and his old
world." ERVING GoFFmAN, STGnMA: NoTEs ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY
58 (1963). Researchers have reported that foster children experience discomfort at having a
surname different than that of their foster parents. See Triseliotis & Hill, supra note 27, at
114 (reporting that sample children adopted by long-term foster parents indicated that
"[t]he main benefit [of the adoption] was the relief of not having to explain to friends and
teachers why they had a different surname from that of their adoptive parents.").
75. Some adult adoptees describe the same sense of embarrassment about their adop-
tive status that foster children relate, however. See Katherine A. Kowal & Karen M.
Schilling, Adoption Through the Eyes ofAdultAdoptees, 55 Ai. J. ORTHOPSYCmATRY 354,
358 (1985) (finding that 17% of sample adults who had been adopted as infants were embar-
rassed or felt uncomfortable about the fact of adoption; 25% reported feeling worried or
insecure about being adopted).
76. Professor Elizabeth Bartholet has recently written at length about "the stigma sur-
rounding adoption [which] constitutes part of the social conditioning to which we are all
subject from birth onward..." BARTHOLET, supra note 1, at 164-86. I agree vith Professor
Bartholet that infertility is stigmatized in American culture and that adoption is thus "set up
as a choice of last resort... for the infertile." Id. at 165. But I believe she exaggerates the
extent to which adoption is the subject of "universal denigration." Id. While the infertile
adoptive parent is sometimes pitied as having settled for a less preferred procreative alter-
native, the adoptive parent who already has biological children is admired for his or her
generosity. More importantly, public sentiment almost always favors adoptive parents over
biological parents in cases in which the two are pitted against each other;, the DeBoers -
Schmidt litigation (In re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993)) and the case of Gregory K.
are but two recent examples of this preference. Bartholet recognizes that biological parents
who give up their children (or who have failed to care for them) are invariably viewed with
contempt, but neglects this overwhelming public preference for adoptive over biological
parents.
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IV.
ADOPTION'S SYMBOLIC BENEFITS: THEIR HIDDEN COSTS
Because the symbolic benefits of adoption have been largely intuited,
their cost and consequences have been largely ignored. Indeed, children's
advocates have not even noted that these symbolic benefits derive from the
same notion of parental rights as property-like entitlements that they ordi-
narily wish to disavow. After adoption, the child belongs to a new set of
parents, who have the right to curtail his contacts with his former family.
The state of belonging implies emotional certainty; but it also implies own-
ership." The current preference for adoption over alternatives that pre-
serve the parental relationship thus serves to preserve and replicate the
same rigid, exclusive definition of parentage that children's advocates have
elsewhere disfavored. The symbolic benefits conferred on foster children
through adoption also impose on them costs that are real and substantial.
A. Overestimation of the Benefits of Foster Care Alternatives
The symbolic benefits conferred by adoption are, first of all, inextrica-
bly linked with a negative depiction of foster care. It is difficult to find a
contemporary discussion of both foster care and adoption in which foster
care is not described as a state of "limbo." While many of these discussions
employ the word limbo to connote a state of impermanence or uncertainty,
the choice of words underscores the symbolic contrast between adoptive
and foster care status. Limbo in its original meaning did not mean imper-
manence; it was the borderland of Hell, an abode of souls barred from
Heaven by circumstances such as lack of baptism. The implication is clear:
Adoption promises salvation; foster care ensures suffering.
This denigration of foster care is unwarranted and has contributed to
overestimation of the benefits to be obtained from current foster care alter-
natives.78 Placement prevention and rapid family reunification are now,
along with adoption, widely perceived as apart of a comprehensive strategy
for remedying the foster care "problem." But while it is undeniably true
that foster care agencies are beset with problems, researchers have repeat-
edly found that most foster children are not harmed by placement and that
many children benefit.79 Moreover, the multiple, long-standing difficulties
of families at risk of foster care placement typically cannot be ameliorated
77. For more detailed exploration of the ambiguity inherent in cultural conceptions of
belonging, see Bruce C. Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy in Family Law: The Waning of
Belonging, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 31-42.
78. For similar views, see, e.g., Barth & Berry, supra note 57, at 85 (describing foster
care as "the recent whipping boy of child welfare services"); Sheila B. Kamerman & Alfred
J. Kahn, The Problems Facing Social Services, 12 CHILDREN & Youm SERVICES REv. 1, 11
(1990) ("[An] unnecessary consequence of the... [Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare
Act of 1980] has been to denigrate foster care of all types.").
79. See Child Welfare Decisionmaking, supra note 14, at 1781-85 (summarizing research
reports on children in foster care and young adults who grew up in foster placements).
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without services that are intensive, long-term, and expensive. But the pre-
ventive and reunification services available today are generally meager,
brief, and cheap."0
The result has been a cure that is arguably worse than the problem.
Researchers have reported that as many as four out of ten foster children
who are discharged to their parents simply wind up in foster care again; 1
more children may thus experience unplanned reunification than experi-
ence unplanned, long-term care.82 Researchers have also noted that a large
percentage of children whose families receive preventive services are sub-
jected to continuing neglect and abuse.
8 3
Recognition of the fact that existing prevention and reunification pro-
grams more often serve the state's fiscal interests than they do the interests
of children has been slow to develop. The linked symbolism of adoption
and foster care is an important reason why.
B. Categorical Decisionmaking that Ignores Children's Needs
The intuited, but unexamined, symbolism of adoption has also contrib-
uted to rigid categorical thinking that ignores the complex realities of foster
care today. Consider, for example, the case of Shamell and Eugene J.,s
who were placed, at the ages of approximately twelve and thirteen, in the
foster home of their paternal aunt. The children's father visited them three
80. See Barth & Berry, supra note 57, at 83 ("preplacement services are often inappro-
priately brief, given the tenacity of family problems and high reabuse rates.... Other
evidence... indicates that services to children who have been reunified are often inade-
quate and end prematurely."). See also LIsBErH B. SCHORR, WrrIN OUR REACH: BREAK-
ING THE CYCLE OF DISADVANTAGE 175-78,284-90 (1988) (reviewing successful programs to
help seriously disadvantaged families and concluding that effective programs must be com-
prehensive, flexible, intensive, and will likely be more costly than traditional services).
81. TRUDY FESTINGER, RETURNING TO CARE: DISCHARGE AND REENTRY IN FOSTER
CARE 1-2 (1994) (surveying reports). See also Elaine Walton, Mark W. Fraser, Robert E.
Lewis, Peter J. Pecora, & Wendel K. Walton, In-Home Family-Focused Reunification: An
Experimental Study, 72 CHILD WELFARE 473, 474 (1993) (reporting that between 20% and
40% of foster children reunited with parents will return to care).
82. See e.g., TESTA & GoERGE, supra note 18, at 58-59 (reporting that in late 1970s
40% of sample llinois foster children who were reunified with family members returned to
foster care, and concluding that "the framers of [the Child Welfare and Adoption Assistance
Act of 1980] ... may have been fundamentally mistaken about what the nature of the foster
care problem was. Instead of foster-care drift, our analysis suggests it may have been the
absence of planning and control in the reunification process").
83. See, e.g., MICHAEL S. WALD, J.M. CARLSMITH, PAML. LEIDERMAN %ITH CAROLE
SMITH & RITA DESALES FRENCH, PROTECTING ABUSED AND NEGLECTED CHILDREN 8S9
(1988) (reporting that two-thirds of sample children whose families received intensive in-
home services were subject to continuing neglect or abuse); MARY AmN JONES, A SECOND
CHANCE FOR FAMILIES-FIVE YEARs LATER: FoLLow-up OF A PROGRAM TO PREVENT
FOSTER CARE 86, 95 (1985) (reporting that substantiated child maltreatment reports were
made in one-quarter of sample cases in which families received intensive in-home services
to avert foster care); Desmond K. Runyon & Carolyn L. Gould, Foster Care for Child Mal-
treatment Impact on Delinquent Behavior, 75 PEDIATmiCS 562,564 (1985) (finding that 25%
of abused children who received in-home services were reabused).
84. In re Shamell J., 609 N.Y.S.2d 185 (App. Div. 1994).
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or four times a month and sometimes attended school functions, but made
it clear to the foster care agency that he was unprepared to assume cus-
tody. 5 After twenty months, the child welfare agency commenced an ac-
tion to terminate the father's parental rights. The trial judge refused to
terminate in these circumstances, describing the agency action as "a farce"
that would serve the primary purpose of absolving the father from child
support responsibilities.8 6 But the appellate court cited standard, boiler-
plate sentiments in favor of adoptive placement and approved the termina-
tion petition:
All children should have stability in their lives... [T]hey should
know the security of being wanted, loved, and cared for by adop-
tive parents ... The "fraud" of the father should not be visited
upon his sons by condemning them to the limbo of permanent
foster care and depriving them of any opportunity for a perma-
nent homey
While the appellate court claims that it is "the situation of the children"
that governs its decision,"8 it is hard to see how. Shamell and Eugene, by
now sixteen and seventeen years of age, would continue to live with their
aunt and see their father no matter what decision the court made. They
would be altogether mystified, I would guess, to learn that the court's order
freed them from "the limbo of permanent foster care" and offered them
"the security of being wanted, loved, and cared for." Their aunt would be
equally surprised to learn that the piece of paper constituting the termina-
tion order affected the quality of her love and stability of her care. Their
father was undoubtedly chuckling all the way to the bank.
It is impossible to imagine the court making similar pronouncements if
the children's father had asked his sister to take care of the children outside
the foster care system, or if the sister were his former wife. These analogies
are far more pertinent to Eugene and Shamell's case than is the "foster
care limbo" the court describes, but abstractions, permanence and adop-
tion, determine the result. And while the case of Shamell and Eugene is
perhaps extreme, the tendency of adoption's abstract symbolism to impede
recognition of messy, individual realities is all too common.
85. Id. at 185-86.
86. Id. at 188. The judge noted that
This case involves money.. .[The father] intends to continue to see them regularly
... What he doesn't want to do is have to support his children... The children live
with his sister. He has absolutely no incentive to contribute to the support of his
children, and if there is a subsidized adoption in this case... he's going to continue
to do exactly as he's been doing .... [I]t's a farce.
Id. at 188-89.
87. Id. at 187.
88. Id. at 188.
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C. Obscuring Benefits to the State Child Welfare System
The symbolic benefits conferred on foster children by adoption have
also obscured the very tangible benefits that this solution offers to state
child welfare systems. Reconsider the case of Shammell and Eugene. A
decade ago, Shamell and Eugene's aunt would not have been a foster par-
ent but, instead, a welfare recipient receiving benefits under the AFDC
program; although the poor families served by the child welfare system
have often relied on relatives for assistance with child rearing s9 until re-
cently family members who filled in for parents were not classified as foster
parents. Although they were often (like the parents themselves) suffi-
ciently poor to qualify for public assistance,90 they were denied the larger
payments available for children in foster care.91 Under these earlier rules,
Shamell, Eugene, and aunt would have been on AFDC, their father a
"deadbeat dad," and child support collection the state's paramount goal.
As a result of lawsuits' and a substantial escalation in the foster care
caseload,93 traditional practice has shifted rapidly over the past decade.
Although "kinship" foster care is still employed sparingly in some jurisdic-
tions, in some states with large urban foster care populations relative place-
ments now constitute approximately 40% of the total foster care
caseload. 94 Under the new kinship foster care rules, Shamell, Eugene, and
aunt receive (more) funds from the AFDC-FC program and permanence
through adoption is the state's paramount goal.
89. See, e.g., NEw YORK CITY MAYOR'S COMMISSION FOR THE FoSTER CARE OF CHIL-
DREN, FAMILY AssETs: KINSHIP FOSTER CARE IN NEw YORK CITY 37-38 (1993) [hereinaf-
ter MAYOR'S COMMISSION REPORT] (describing studies demonstrating link between poverty
and extended family networks and traditional use of extended family networks in Latino
and African-American culture).
90. See id. at 37 (reporting that approximately half of kinship foster mothers live close
to or beneath the established poverty line); Timothy J. Gebel, Kinship Care and Nonrelative
Family Foster Care: Comparing Caregiver Attributes and Attitudes, 75 CHILD WELFARE 5,6-
8, 10-11 (1996) (summarizing research on attributes of kinship foster parents and reporting
that sample kinship caregivers had significantly lower levels of income and education than
regular foster parents).
91. See Eugene M. Lewit, Children in Foster Care, 3 Tim FUrURE OF CHIDREN 192,
198 (1993) (reporting that in some states kinship foster parents are paid less than others).
92. In Miller v. Youakim, 440 U.S. 125 (1979), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Fed-
eral law mandated the same level of foster care reimbursement to children in kinship foster
homes as in nonrelated placements. The rapid expansion of New York City's kinship foster
care population resulted from a settlement reached with the plaintiffs in Eugene F. v. Gross,
Index No. 1125/86, Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co., in which the City's failure to furnish foster care bene-
fits and services to court-placed children residing in relatives' homes was challenged.
93. By one estimate, the foster care population increased 53% between 1987 and 1992.
McKenzie, supra note 64, at 63 (citing data from American Public Welfare Association).
The rapid caseload escalation taxed existing foster parent resources, making placements
with relatives a more desirable alternative.
94. In California in 1991, 43% of all foster care placements were with relatives; more
than half of African-American children were placed with relatives. Lewit, supra note 91, at
195, 198 (citing data from California's Little Hoover Commission). In New York in 1991,
40% of all children in foster care were in kinship care. MAYOR'S COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 89, at 25.
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Both the past and current goals of child welfare practice serve the
state's fiscal interests. But neither goal benefits Eugene and Shamell. The
mythology of adoption as the great, good thing has inhibited acknowledge-
ment of the fiscal benefits adoption confers on the state, and which typi-
cally drive the termination petition process. 95
D. The Sacrifice of Children's Emotional Needs
Adoption's powerful symbolism not only obscures the very real bene-
fits that this solution confers on the taxpayer, but it imposes direct costs on
the children we intend to help. The positive future symbolized by an adop-
tion order inexorably darkens the past and stigmatizes both the child's for-
mer parents and identity. Her acceptance of a new family implies
abandonment of her biological family and the death of her old self; Shawn
Russ, post-adoption, was no longer Gregory K. Many older foster children
cannot face a such a loss, 96 and even those who are willing to do so pay a
heavy price: The past can be buried, but it cannot be erased.97 The at-
tempt to wipe away the past may also cause more harm than good; thus
even Gregory K.'s adoptive mother stressed the advantages to him of a
continued relationship with his biological mother: "I think it would be
good for [Gregory and his biological mother] ... if they could have some
kind of relationship someday.. ." Mrs. Russ told reporters, "I think then
he could work through his anger.""8 The price of adoption's symbolic ben-
efits is neglect of the child's real emotional needs.
This is not a trade-off that we consider advantageous for children
outside the foster care system. Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit's proposal that
custodial parents should have complete control over visitation rights after
divorce has not been taken up by a single .child advocate, despite the fact
that it derives from exactly the same notions of bonding and parental exclu-
sivity that have motivated many to urge easier termination of parental
95. For a discussion of how the foster care system negatively affects the child's security
in parental support, see Wendy A. Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children's
Perspectives and the Law, 36 ARIz. L. REv. 11, 46-51 (1994) (concluding that "[c]hildren
born to poor families soon learn they have no entitlement to support from their parents, but
instead are subject to continual state supervision and resettlement, like refugees, among
foster homes.").
96. See, e.g., Malcolm Bush & Andrew C. Gordon, The Case for Involving Children in
Child Welfare Decisions, 27 Soc. WORK 309, 310 (1982) (reporting that 50% of sample fos-
ter children judged unlikely to return home did not wish to be adopted; most were older and
cited preservation of ties with biological family as basis for disinclination); CHILD WELFARE
AT A CROSSROADS, supra note 60, at 70 ("When asked outright, 'Do you want to be
adopted?' it is understandable that so many teens answer 'No."').
97. John Bowlby perhaps has put it best: "[Children] are not slates from which the past
can be rubbed off with a duster or sponge, but human beings who carry their previous
experiences with them and whose behavior in the present is profoundly affected by what has
gone before." BOWLBY, MATERNAL CARE, supra note 32, at 113-14.
98. Hewitt, supra note 71, at 58.
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rights.99 The tendency of children's advocates has, instead, been to support
yet a broader range of visitation rights - for stepparents, grandparents -
in order to preserve the child's existing relationships. 100
Divorce law today potentially affects all children while child welfare
law is reserved for those who are poor. The result is a class-based divide -
in advocacy, theory, and law - that assumes real differences in children's
pain based essentially on the receipt of public benefits.10 1 We have ex-
pected poor children, and only poor children, to gratefully sacrifice their
past lives in order to obtain the benefits it suits us to provide.10° In the
process, we have further stigmatized the lives of the children for whom
foster placement will be inevitable, and subjected many of them to the fur-
ther impermanence of "revolving door" care.
But the emotional lives of poor children are not different from those
of the more fortunate. Their parents are equally significant. Their need for
evidence of parental love and for opportunities for reconciliation are just as
great. For most, loving foster or adoptive parents will not, any more than
stepparents, erase the ties that bind parent and child.
In an ideal world, we would recognize that the emotional needs of
foster children and children of divorce are similar, and utilize equivalent
rules that protect the parent-child relationship and deny visitation only
when it is detrimental to the child. It is altogether possible, of course, that
we cannot offer foster children what is ideal. Fiscal constraints and the
demands of potential adoptive parents are realities that make it difficult to
fully meet foster children's needs. But if we cannot offer these children
what is best, we do them no favor by refusing to admit it.
With that refusal, we also sacrifice the possibility of doing better. A
decade ago I believed that, with adequate safeguards against interference
by biological parents and adequate information on the child's need for con-
tinued contact, legal standards that emphasized the preservation of the
99. It has, instead, been extensively criticized. For examples, see, e.g., Why Terminate?,
supra note 9, at 453 n.141 (listing sources).
100. For descriptions of statutory and case law on the custody and visitation rights of
stepparents, see, e.g., David Chambers, Stepparents, Biologic Parents, and the Laivs Percep-
tion of "Family" After Divorce, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 102 (Stephen D.
Sugarman & Herma H. Kay eds., 1990); Margaret M. Mahoney, Support and Custody As-
pects of the Stepparent-Child Relationship, 70 CoRNE. L. REv. 38 (1984); Levy, supra note
56. For descriptions of statutory and case law on grandparents' visitation rights, see, e.g.,
Annotation, Grandparents' Visitation Rights, 90 A.LRP 3d 222 (1979 & Supp. 1993);
Catherine Bostock, Does the Expansion of Grandparent Visitation Rights Promote the Best
Interests of the Child? A Survey of Grandparent Visitation Laws in the Fifty States, 27
CoLum. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 319 (1994).
101. See generally Martha Minow, Forward: Justice Engendered, 101 HARv. L REv. 10,
11 (1987) (criticizing "use [of] categories like gender, race, ethnicity, and class to presume
real differences in people's pain").
102. For a description of two cases exemplifying class-based differences in judicial anal-
ysis of parental and family visitation rights, see Karen Czapanskiy, Babies, Parents, and
Grandparents: A Story in Two Cases, 1 J. GENDER & L 85, 109-12 (1993).
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child's ties with the biological family would not seriously affect the number
of individuals willing to become permanent parent substitutes for former
foster children.10 3 Although the rapid expansion of the foster care popula-
tion in recent years challenges that assessment,0 4 I remain unconvinced
that we cannot improve our efforts to meet both the child's need for a sta-
ble loving home and the maintenance of his earlier family ties.
CONCLUSION
In sum, I believe that today's preference for adoption over other forms
of permanent placement that would preserve the parent-child relationship
derives from a complex interrelationship of factors: Adoption is a well-
accepted legal category that effects a clear change in status. It offers mone-
tary benefits as compared to foster care and better satisfies the desires of
adoptive parents to have their own child. Adoption also offers a potent
positive symbolism that confers rebirth and offers a fresh start with a new
identity.
But the symbolic benefits conferred on foster children through adop-
tion have been purchased at a very considerable price and have obscured
the very real benefits conferred on both the state and adult adoptive par-
ents. The denigration of foster care contributes to the widespread accept-
ance of cheap foster care alternatives that subject children to more risks
than they prevent and to rigid, abstract decisionmaking that ignores the
realities of many foster children's lives. Obtaining the symbolic benefits of
adoption also requires the sacrifice of children's real emotional needs, a
tragic choice that we do not impose on the more privileged children outside
the foster care system. Perhaps we can do no better, but certainly we
should not congratulate ourselves that the current approach represents
what is best. It is preferable to make tragic choices consciously than to
pretend that there is no tragedy and no choice.
103. See Why Terminate, supra note 9, at 480-82.
104. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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